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1. Introduction 
 
In her paper, Ismail argues that common approaches to teaching critical thinking based on 
informal logic are inadequate on a number of grounds and that equating the ability to think 
critically with the ability to analyze and evaluate arguments is problematic. To remedy these 
inadequacies, she proposes a pedagogy based in rhetoric. I shall first examine her critiques of 
informal logic and then turn to the alternative she proposes. 
 
2. Critiques 
 
Ismail’s critique takes a number of  specific forms, but there is an underlying idea that unites the 
individual criticisms: What is generally offered as critical thinking in post-secondary philosophy 
courses, i.e., argument analysis, is inadequate, and problematic and that such courses should 
have a broader mandate and content. This criticism takes a number of specific forms. 
 
2.1 From philosophy and education 
A number of the criticisms she offers come from the perspective of philosophy and education.  
One of these focuses on the inadequacy of informal logic for achieving its expressed purpose, 
that is, dealing with arguments in natural language. The focus on pre-recorded, usually written 
discourse is problematic in ignoring the context-dependence of natural language, the 
contestability of assumptions and principles appealed to in arguments, and the uncertainties and 
difficulties in the topics people argue about. 
 Another criticism relates to the limited nature of the subject matter examined by this 
approach. Ismail claims that there are other phenomena in addition to written arguments that 
require critical analysis – such things as visual communication (e.g., images, film), interior 
phenomena not expressed in language, modern communications institutions.  
 The exclusive focus on written argumentation also omits other important contexts of 
argumentation and communication, namely auditory and face to face contexts. She argues that 
enhancing the ability to think critically in spontaneous, real time contexts and to attend to the 
social and political contexts of in-person communication and to aspects such as gestures and tone 
of voice are important components of critical thinking instruction which are not addressed in the 
informal logic approach. 
 Ismail also criticizes the informal logic approach for failing to attend to the affective and 
social dimensions which are central to critical thinking. Teaching critical thinking needs to 
develop not just knowledge and cognitive skill but also, and importantly, a “willingness to use 
such knowledge and skill.” Such skills and dispositions are best developed through an exchange 
of ideas about real issues in a social context. Research on the effects of various methods of 
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developing critical thinking have found that  the best techniques for critical thinking instruction 
are providing environments for discussion and providing opportunities for solving authentic life 
problems, neither of which are common features of critical thinking courses. 
 
2.2 From psychology and neuroscience 
Another set of criticisms of the informal logic approach  is derived from the realms of 
psychology and of neuroscience. Ismail cites Thagard’s argument that common inference errors 
are rooted in emotional ‘biases’ rather than in arguments in support of the claim that attending to 
psychological processes rather than studying logical fallacies is a better way to teach critical 
thinking. 
 She also draws on the neurobiological research of Immordino-Yang et al. that emphasizes 
the role of emotional experiences and social relationships in cognition to argue that education 
should  facilitate active engagement with emotionally based content and socially transmitted 
ideas, neither of which is emphasized in the teaching of informal logic. Each of these criticisms 
reinforces points made in the philosophical and educational critiques about the centrality of the 
emotional and social dimensions of critical thinking. 
 
3. Examining the critiques 
 
Ismail’s project involves a questioning of the relationship between critical thinking and 
argumentation, a project with which I have considerable sympathy. That critical thinking has 
become equated with argument analysis in critical thinking courses is, I would argue, a result of 
the fact that such courses were developed primarily as a response to or replacement for courses 
in formal logic in philosophy departments. Although the primary focus of these courses has been 
on informal arguments rather than formal reasoning, their heritage in formal logic is still evident 
in the emphasis on the structure and evaluation of individual, de-contextualized arguments. 
 It is important to note, however, that most common conceptions of critical thinking are 
not focused exclusively or even primarily on the analysis and evaluation of individual 
arguments; take for example Siegel’s “being appropriately moved by reasons” (1988), Ennis’s 
“reasonable, reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do” (1987), or 
Lipman’s “thinking that (1) facilitates judgment because it (2) relies on criteria, (3) is self-
correcting, and (4) is sensitive to context” (2003). All these conceptions have as their core idea 
that critical thinking involves making reasoned judgments in a variety of contexts and all have a 
potentially much broader application than the evaluation of individual arguments.  
 I see two main questions, then, regarding the efficacy and adequacy of argument analysis: 
1) is it adequate to the task of fostering critical thinking in the context of argumentation? and, 2) 
are there other appropriate objects of critical thinking besides individual, usually written 
arguments? 
 With respect to argumentation, I would argue (and have argued elsewhere -- Bailin and 
Battersby 2009, 2016a) that the analysis of individual, decontextualized arguments, although it 
can help us to eliminate problematic arguments, cannot get us to the goal of making reasoned 
judgments. This task is a dialectical one, involving a comparative evaluation of a variety of 
contending positions and arguments using epistemological norms and a consideration of context. 
There are, in fact, approaches to critical thinking instruction that take an explicitly dialectical 
approach (cf. her reference to  dissoi logoi) (Bailin and Battersby 2016a).  
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 I would also agree that there is a case to be made for broadening the scope of critical 
thinking instruction. There are, as Ismail argues, many phenomena in need of critical scrutiny 
and contexts where the making of reasoned judgments is vitally important. The need for a 
broader focus has, in fact, been recognized in some theorizing about and educational approaches 
to critical thinking. Ennis’s detailed list of critical thinking abilities does, in fact, include many 
abilities beyond those directly related to analysing individual arguments, for example  evaluating 
sources, judging observation reports, drawing generalizations and causal explanations from data, 
making and judging value judgments (Ennis 2011). Theorists are also giving attention to the 
context of argumentation (cf. her reference kairos) (Battersby and Bailin 2011), to visual 
argumentation (Dove 2016, Groarke 1996), and to in-person argumentation (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 2007; Stevens 2016, 0219), including how to respond to fallacies (Bailin and 
Battersby 2016a). And there are pedagogical approaches, particularly at the K – 12 level, which 
focus on making judgments based in criteria across a range of areas and subject matters and with 
respect to a diversity of phenomena, including works of literature, tasks of construction and 
creation, and practical and moral decisions (Case and Daniels 2016).  
 The importance of the affective dimension of critical thinking and the centrality of a 
commitment to reasoned judgment and its concomitant virtues have been widely recognized by 
critical thinking theorists (Ennis 1996, 2011; Siegel 1988, 1999). Nonetheless, I do agree with 
Ismael that most traditional approaches to teaching critical thinking do very little to promote 
them. 
 One exception is the community of inquiry approach (Dewey 1938, Lipman 2003, Bailin 
and Battersby 2016b). Critical thinking virtues are fostered through the creation if a community 
which instantiates the norms of critical inquiry and in which students deliberate and exchange 
ideas in a group context. There is, in fact, considerable research supporting the value of group 
deliberation for developing critical thinking (e.g., Mercier 2017, Mercier et al. 2017). 
 
4. Rhetorical Pedagogy 
 
One question I have, then, is whether any of these types of approaches address the concerns that 
Ismail raises. Would any of them fall under her notion of rhetorical pedagogy? And what can 
rhetorical pedagogy add that is not included in these approaches? Responding to these questions 
requires a clarification of how she understands rhetoric, rhetorical pedagogy, and the relationship 
between rhetorical pedagogy and critical thinking. She cites numerous theorists offering 
differing, and sometimes conflicting, views, but it is not clear what exactly her own conception is 
nor the nature of the pedagogical alternative she is proposing. 
 She does say that rhetoric can be an effective tool for critical literacy, helping us to 
understand how human communication functions and how different positions are rhetorically 
situated, and aiding us in defending against manipulation and in using communication 
responsibly. What is not clear, however, is what she believes the relationship is between 
rhetorical pedagogy and critical thinking. Numerous different possibilities are suggested in the 
paper. Are they distinctive practices which have overlapping themes and purposes, both aiming 
to foster rational decision-making? Are they intertwined and jointly reinforcing, rhetorical skill 
aiding in the development of critical thinking and critical thinking enhancing rhetorical skill? Is 
rhetoric intended to add to the tool-kit of critical thinking? Is there no difference between them, 
critical thinking being basically just rhetorical pedagogy? 
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 Moreover, what is she suggesting in the name of rhetorical pedagogy? Should courses in 
rhetoric replace courses in critical thinking? Should critical thinking be taught through a 
rhetorical pedagogy? Should rhetoric be included in the teaching of critical thinking? Should 
critical thinking courses still focus on argument analysis but with a rhetorical dimension 
included? Should courses in critical thinking change to focus less on argument analysis and be 
restructured to address her concerns? The fact that she recommends “an instructional approach to 
educating for critical thinking which includes a consideration of context and encourages social 
and emotional competencies” suggests that she holds the last of these positions. And I would 
argue that this is precisely what some of the approaches to critical thinking cited previously are 
designed to accomplish, although generally they do not explicitly invoke rhetoric as an 
inspiration or justification. 
 What, then, might a pedagogy which explicitly calls on rhetoric add? I suggest that it 
might involve more of a focus on the communicative aspects of discourse and argumentation.  
More attention would be paid to the medium and manner of expression, to the intended 
audiences as well as to the communicator, and to the background assumptions underlying 
rhetorical choices. It would also attend to the contexts of communication, including the social 
and political dimensions related to media and to our communication institutions. Some current 
critical thinking approaches do incorporate explicit rhetorical elements, for example Ennis  
advocating employing appropriate rhetorical strategies in discussions and presentations (2011); 
Bailin and Battersby’s focus on making a case (2016a) and also on identifying the persuasive 
power of fallacies (2015), Groarke and Tindale’s focus on the principles of communication 
(2012). Nonetheless, they tend not to be a major focus of most approaches. 
 What needs to be strongly maintained and emphasized in this relationship, however, is 
the focus of critical thinking on epistemic criteria of evaluation and the making of reasoned 
judgments. To the extent that rhetorical methods can contribute to or add to this project, they 
should be welcomed. 
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